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Over the last years, in a series papers by Arrechi and others, a model for the cognitive processes  
involved in decision making has been proposed and investigated. The key element of this model is 
the expression of apprehension and judgment, basic cognitive process of decision making, as an  
inverse Bayes inference classifying the information content of neuron spike trains. It has been shown 
that  for  successive  plural  stimuli  this  inference,  equipped  with  basic  non-algorithmic  jumps,  is  
affected  by  quantum-like  characteristics.  We show here  that  such  a  decision  making  process  is 
related consistently with an ambiguous representation by an observer within a universe of discourse.  
In our work the ambiguous representation of an object or a stimuli is defined as a pair of maps from 
objects  of  a  set  to  their  representations,  where  these  two  maps  are  interrelated  in  a  particular  
structure. The a priori and a posteriori hypotheses in Bayes inference are replaced by the upper and  
lower approximations, correspondingly, for the initial data sets that are derived with respect to each 
map. Upper and lower approximations herein are defined in the context of “rough set” analysis. The 
inverse Bayes inference is implemented by the lower approximations with respect to the one map 
and for the upper approximation with respect to the other map for a given data set. We show further 
that, due to the particular structural relation between the two maps, the logical structure of such 
combined approximations can only be expressed as an orthomodular lattice and therefore can be 
represented  by  a  quantum  rather  than  a  Boolean  logic.  To  our  knowledge,  this  is  the  first  
investigation aiming to reveal the concrete logic structure of inverse Bayes inference in cognitive  
processes.
1. Introduction
Cognition  in  the  process  of  decision  making  has  two  distinct  features,  namely 
apprehension and judgment. By apprehension we understand the coherent perception correlated with 
the recruitment and engagement in collective behavior of the required neuronal populations and by 
judgment  we  understand  the  process  of  comparing  and  of  correlating  -at  least  two-  earlier 
apprehensions. Judgment requires memory and a certain degree of self-awareness, in the sense that 
the observer can hold on and internalize as its own a set of previously apprehended stimuli. Both  
processes require some kind of representation which entails their conceptualization; evidently both  
processes afford context dependencies within a certain framework of cognitive references. Arrechi  
critically discuss this issue in [1-5] and points out its quantum-like nature. 
Recently  theoretical  and  experimental  advances  in  the  area  of  quantum cognition  and 
decision highlight this quantum-likeness of conceptualization. This endeavor brings together results  
from  cognitive  mathematical  psychology  [6],  'rational  decision  theory'  and  finance  [7,  8,  9],  
experimental  and  theoretical  artificial  intelligence  [10,  11],  and  quantum  probability's  logical 
structure [12, 13, 14]. Much is owned to the seminal work of Aerts from 1995 till now [15-24]. 
Nowadays,  quantum-like behavior in language,  concept correspondence and operational  research 
and decision making have been developed in several publications by a considerable community of 
authors. For a comprehensive overview of the field one can consult the reference works covered in 
the recently published books by Busemeyer and Bruza [25], and by Khrennikov [26].
These authors focus on the probabilistic aspects and statistical verifications of structural 
aspects  of  quantum logic  and quantum probability,  while  the  studies  of  the  dynamical  basis  of  
cognitive  processes  involved  in  decision  making  usually  follow  a  more  microscopic  classical 
approach based on neural dynamics, see for example [25, 28]. Notably the role of chaotic dynamics 
in biological information processing, pioneered by the work of Nicolis and Tsuda [29] has been 
theoretically and experimentally investigated over the last decades by the group of Walter Freeman,  
K.  Kaneko  and others  (an  overview in  [1,  29],  particularly  chapters  13,  15,  16,  17).  Arrechi's 
proposal aims at bridging these two aspects, i.e. structural and dynamical, by constructing a model  
based on data sets from spike train synchronization and recursive (forward and inverse) Bayesian  
inference. The information content of the data sets of recorded neural spike-trains and analyzed by 
entropic measures enabling thus the tracing of suitable cross- and auto- correlation indexes. Based 
on such an approach Arrechi and his team conjecture and offer estimations for the existence of a  
quantal constant (Note: This is not the standard Plank constant of quantum physics but rather a  
quantum-like constant in the spirit of quantal neuron discharge proposed by Katz [31]) underlying 
specific quantum-like information processing for visual stimuli.  As Arecchi demonstrates [32-34] 
the operation of the observing apparatus is equivalent to the operation of monitoring a Wigner 
distribution. The reported time coding implies  a  Wigner non-local  measurement that  stores and 
reads data in a global rather than a serial local fashion. 
In the present work we built further on the procedure proposed by Arrechi and his team by 
considering  an  ambiguous  representation  based  on  “rough  set  analysis  [35-41]”  via  a  pair  of  
mappings  that  serve  as  a  model  for  Bayesian  recurrent  inferences  within  the  conceptual 
categorization of stimuli afforded by an observer in a universe of discourse. We show that this can  
account, in a consistent way, for the quantum theoretical conjecture of Arrechi. We are able to show 
this  by  examining  the  underlying  logic  of  the  pair  of  mappings  which  turns  out  to  be  an 
orthomodular lattice as the ones related to quantum logic [42-44].
The paper is organized as follows, in Section 2 we briefly present the approach outlined by 
Arrechi and co-workers and discuss the inverse Bayesian procedure and its non-algorithmic aspects.  
Section 3 is the main exposition of our construction. In its first sub-section we develop the basic  
rationale for our rough set analysis framework. In the second sub-section we construct the two maps 
that implement an ambiguous representation based on the previous analysis and we offer specific 
examples for our model. In the third sub-section we discuss the derivation of a lattice of logical 
propositions  from a  rough  set  approximation.  The  fourth,  and  closing  sub-section,  of  the  third  
section presents the proof that the derived lattice of logical propositions coming from the above 
ambiguous representation is orthomodular,  hence related to a quantum-logic lattice rather than a 
classical Boolean one. In Section 4 we revisit Arrechi's quantum-like hypothesis and we show that  
our scheme is consistent with his conjecture. Concluding in Section 5, we discuss the prospects of  
rough  set  approximation  as  a  model  for  the  inverse  Bayes  inference  process  and  their  non-
algorithmic aspects and the outlook that this might entail for further investigations.
2. From apprehension to judgment and Quantum Bayes inference
In this section we briefly present the quantum theoretical conjecture proposed by Arecchi. 
As  discussed  in  [2]  apprehension consists  of  a  coherent  perception  which  emerges  from  the 
recruitment of neuronal groups, and judgment consists by recalling in memory previous apprehended 
units, coded in a suitable language, which subsequently are compared and selected in order to attain 
a judgment.
The  first  process,  apprehension,  has  a  duration  around  1sec;  its  associated  neuronal 
correlate can be traced by EEG (electroencephalogram) signals synchronized in the “gamma band” 
(frequencies between 40 and 60 Hz) coming from distant cortical areas. It can be described as an  
interpretation of the sensory stimuli on the basis of available algorithms, through a (forward) Bayes 
inference. 
Following [1, 2, 3], let h be the interpretative, competing, hypotheses in the presence of a 
sensory  stimulus  piece  of  data,  d,  the  (forward)  Bayes  inference,  selects  the  most  plausible 
hypothesis, h*, that determines the motor reaction, exploiting an a priori existing algorithm, P(d|h). 
That represents the conditional probability that a datum d is conforming with an hypothesis h. The 
P(d|h) are given e.g. have been learned during the past. They represent the equipment, or faculties,  
by which a cognitive agent, be it natural or artificial, faces and interprets its universe of discourse.  
For example, equipping a robot with a convenient set of P(d|h), we expect a sensible behavior within 
a given environment providing sensory input translated to its repertoire of responses. 
The second process, judgment, entails a comparison between two apprehensions acquired 
at different times, coded in a given language and recalled by memory. Let us call d the code of the 
second apprehension and h* the code of the first one, now -at variance with apprehension- it is h* 
that  is already given; and instead the relation  P(d|h) which connects  them must be retrieved, it 
represents the conformity between d and h*, that is, the best interpretation of d in the light of h*. For 
example, as in [1, 2], two successive pieces of the text can be compared and the conformity of the 
second one with respect to the first one can be determined. This is very different from apprehension, 
where there is no problem of conformity but of plausibility of h* in view of a motor reaction. In [1, 
2] the following two examples serve as illustration: “a rabbit perceives a rustle behind a hedge and it  
runs away, without investigating whether it was a fox or just a blow of wind. … As Walter Freeman  
puts it the life of a brainy animal consists of the recursive use of this inferential procedure [29]. … 
On the contrary, to catch the meaning of the 4-th verse of a poem, I must recover at least the 3-rd 
verse of that same poem, since I do not have a-priori algorithms to provide a satisfactory answer”. 
The bottom-up process entails the competition between two neuron groups fed by the same 
sensory  stimulus  d, while  in  the  bottom-up  procedure  different  interpretational  stimuli,  P(d|h), 
provided by memory compete for selection. The one that prevails, as the corresponding top-down 
algorithm, P(d|h), succeeds in better synchronizing neuron pulses of certain neural correlates than its 
concurrent competitors within the signal reader's “global workspace”, where signals from different 
areas converge [45]. Thus, the winning hypothesis h* which will finally be driving the motor system 
is that which is provided by the selected neural correlate.
The whole process of top-down selection requires some form of self-awareness, and a representation 
scheme within the global workspace since the agent who performs the comparison must be aware  
that the two non-simultaneous apprehensions are submitted to its scrutiny. In contradistinction with 
apprehension, judgment  does not presuppose a previously existing algorithm but it rather builds a 
new one, in an ad hoc fashion, through an inverse Bayes procedure [3]. It is exactly this construction 
of a new algorithm that Arrechi considers as the source of creativity and decisional freedom. In line 
with the  pioneering investigations of Ernst Pöppel  [46-48] the cognitive relevance  of the  3sec  
interval  for  judgment  has  been  also  explored  by  Arrechi  and  his  team on  various  experiments 
evolving subjects exposed to linguistic (literary and musical) texts. 
Therefore, the process of judgment is not mechanical as it requires the ad hoc construction of a code 
for  comparing  and  selecting  two  previously  acquired  apprehensions.  Of  course,  once  attained, 
judgments can be stored and memorized as resources for future reference. But each time a judgment 
is  implemented will  be a  modified,  even novel  and hopefully enriched,  version of  the previous  
instances. Here is how Arrechi puts it [1] “As in any exposure to a text (literary, musical, figurative)  
a re-reading improves my understanding”.  The non-mechanical and non-algorithmic nature of the 
construction of a judgment is achieved by means of an inverse Bayes procedure [3, 4]. As far as the 
question concerning whether or not a computing machine can judge so that it can emulate a human 
cognitive agent (nb: refering to the Turing test), the answer is unequivocally “no”. The condition that 
judgment entails “non-algorithmic jumps” is true as far as the inverse Bayesian inference process has 
to generate an ad hoc algorithm, build on the spot, data and context dependent,  and by no means  
given beforehand.
Following the above line of reasoning Arrechi has formulated a quantum-like conjecture, aiming at 
explaining  the  necessary  fast  search  within  a  semantic  space;  in  a  global  rather  than  a  local,  
sequential, exploration. This provides an uncertainty relation, ruled by a quantum-like constant, that 
yields a  “decoherence” or  de-correlation time compatible  with the short  term memory windows 
given by the experiments on linguistic understanding [1-4, 18-21]. In addition and to accord with 
this  quantum-like  line  of  investigation  the  “K-test”  had  also  been  considered  [49],  as  the  time 
equivalent of Bell inequalities in [5], and evidence is presented as a case of pseudo-violation of the 
Leggett-Garg inequality (p-LGI).
We further elaborate on the above exposition of apprehension and judgment by considering the role  
and position of an observer which is always a crucial issue in physics. As long as an observer stays  
outside  of  a  universe  of  observations  and  retains  a  non-invasive  role  any  objects  within  this 
“universe”  can  be  described  independently  of  the  observer,  and their  properties  can be defined  
without  being  influenced  by  the  act  of  observation.  By contrast,  if  an observer  stays  inside  its  
“universe”, we are faced with issues of interface and its interference on the designation of a cut-off  
between the inside, which is empirically known, and the outside which is empirically unknown [50-
56]. In the case, where the act of observation disturbs the  universe of observables an observer has to  
pay attention to (a) incompleteness and/or inconsistency in its  universe which can be viewed as 
resulting from its own internal state perturbations, (b) chaos due to positive feedback loops between 
the act of observation and the properties of the objects observed, and (c) even stochasticity arising 
from constrains prohibiting complete determination of observables. An approach that aims 
to offer a description of  a given universe viewed from an inside observer,  has been 
proposed under the general term “endophysics”  in [50] (for an easily accessible review 
by   I.   Tsuda   and  T.   Ikegami,   see   [57]).   The   universe   underpinning   these   internal 
perturbations due to the inclusion of the observer and the unavoidable self­referential 
issues   could  be  described   thanks   to   the   chaotic   dynamics   in   classical  macroscopic 
systems [29, 30] or thanks to quantum mechanics in microscopic systems [58], but the 
problem of  observer participation still  remains as one of  the most fascinating open 
problems [59].
As it is not the “quantum true matter” of quantum mechanics or the “Higgs ocean” or 
the “psi­waves” that we observe, but patterns of energy and information exchanged by 
the   self  and   the  environment   through   the  various   filters   of   the   interfacing  of   our 
sensory organs, as W. Ebeling puts it, the deception has its roots in the evolution of life. 
In its particular form it differs significantly from organism to organism [60] (also in 
chapt. 9 in [1]). Each animal creates its “perceived objects” or its own cognitive space  
according to the attached survival relevance. Therefore,   one of the greatest problems 
related to the issues of inside versus outside is the origin of self­consciousness and self­
awareness or how can the brain be led to making self­consistent decisions against an 
unknown external world. In contemporary brain sciences the brain as a collection of 
neural   cells   is   analyzed  by   their   correlates,  while   single  neurons  are   regarded  as 
dynamical systems. The nonlinear nature of which can affected by chaotic dynamics, 
hence   sometimes   called   as   a   chaotic   neuron   [29,   30].   The   synchronization   and 
correlation   effects   afforded  by   small   groups   of   neuron   in   their   chaotic   regime  are 
recently at the cutting edge of modern research [27, 28]. It is also customary that the 
perception can be viewed as the interplay of bottom­up stimuli processed by neurons 
locally and top­down interpretation excreting control in a global fashion. The fact that 
the whole process is affected by chaotic dynamics has been established both in theoretical and 
experimental grounds [61-63]. Thus the interplay of bottom up, top down processes is destined to be  
the generation of  an array of  probabilities  of  different  decisions,  and making a  decision should  
account to the degeneration or “collapse” of this array of probabilities to one specific outcome. A 
particular motor decision emerges from the processing unit's global work space where the choice  
among competing signals arriving to it takes place. In some hypothesis, global work space acts as a 
threshold system by which the winner of competing neural groups is chosen [33-34, 45]. That is  
verified by evidence where the largest synchronized domain has occurred with each interpretation.
        Apprehension can be described by successive applications of the (forward) Bayes inference 
using the same algorithm, and that corresponds to the analogy of the computation of climbing up an  
isolated  peak  by  using  only  local  information  of  the  'mountain'  topology  of  the  landscape.  By 
contrast,  the  judgment  corresponds  to  the  analogy  of  the  computation  within  climbing  a  
'mountainous  landscape'  with  multiple  peaks.  Since  a  'climber'  uses  only  a  local  topological  
information such as the local gradients, one can reach not necessarily the global maximum but surely 
the local maximum, in this analogy the locally accessible highest peak. According to Arecchi, if a 
climber has an information on the global geometry, then the mixture of semantics (global geometry) 
and  syntactical  computation  (choice  of  the  step  with  the  local  biggest  gradient)  can  entail  an 
unreachable peak. Much like truths not decidable in Gödel’s theorem of incompleteness [2]. How 
does the global “work space” [45] make a decision in judgment against this paradoxical situation? 
Non-algorithmic  jump  affected  by  the  quantum-like  effects  could  realize  a  judgment  that  
corresponds to an inverse Bayes inference. While these ideas are examined by quantum Bayesian  
theory, a concrete mathematical model has not yet been proposed.
        Independent of the quantum Bayesian approach, a class of “universes of discourse” inherent  
with ambiguity due to internal perturbations or lack of complete knowledge has been developed 
within the research field of soft computing by which ambiguous decisions could be allowed, in such 
approaches as in “fuzzy set”[64] and “rough set”[35-37] theories. Since the boundary of a fuzzy set 
or a rough set is indefinite and/or ambiguous, a small set of them can be used like an open set or  
neighborhood in the sense of specific topological spaces. Therefore, descriptions in a term of rough 
sets can be implemented as the logical structure of a partially ordered set or a lattice. This kind of 
ideas have been employed to the study of  cognition with respect  to  discretized notions such as 
concepts, events and decisions. However, no study relating rough set approximation theory has been 
proposed for  the issue regarding the inside versus outside role  of  the observer or  in  relation to 
quantum logic. To our knowledge, no such study within the various quantum Bayesian approaches 
appear to this effect. This is the main motivation which leads us to initiate our investigation for 
connections. 
        We show herein, using a technique based on rough set analysis, that the cut-off between the  
inside  and  outside  universes  of  discourse  of  an  observer  can  be  expressed  by  an  ambiguous 
representation for an object and its representation and that this ambiguous representation can be 
implemented by a pair of maps interrelated by a particular structure; moreover we show that the 
logic of such a pair of maps can be expressed as an orthomodular lattice like the ones familiar from 
quantum  logic  [12,  24,  25].  This  demonstration  accounts  as  a  cognition  model  based  on  an 
ambiguous representation in  terms of rough set lattice  [39-41]. We also show that  our model is 
consistent with the quantum approach proposed by Arecchi based on forward and inverse Bayesian 
inferences. A pair of rough set theory approximations for the data provided by an external stimulus is 
compared  to  the  hypotheses,  a  priori  and  a  posteriori  respectively,  while  the  inverse  Bayesian 
inference  can  be  expressed  as  a  composition  of  two  kinds  of  maps  assigned  to  an  ambiguous 
representation. Therefore, the above proposed scheme shows that the inverse Bayesian inference can 
be implemented by using our cognition model which is derived from rough set approximations.
3. Cognitive model based on ambiguous cognition
3-1 Inside vs outside duality implemented by the deconstructed axiom of choice
Human  beings  and  other  biological  entities  are  faced  with  the  outside  surrounding 
themselves, they can perceive and recognize objects in the outside. How is their perception and/or 
cognition possible against the choice or cut off determining what is inside and what is outside? If 
this  cognitive process  is  implemented  or  defined as  a  map such  that  objects  in  the outside are  
mapped into representations in the inside, the cut off of the inside vs outside is losing its sharp  
boundaries. Otherwise, if we focus on the crisp discontinuity between the inside and outside, how 
can such cognitive processes ever be implemented? Let us start by first introducing the discontinuity 
of the inside and outside of an observer by the difference between countable and uncountable sets.
Uncountable sets were first rigorously introduced and studied by Cantor via its famous 
diagonal  argument.  The  work  of  Cantor  on standard  set  theory  implies  that  even  if  a  set  X,  is 
equivalent to the set of natural numbers (i.e. countable), the power set of X is uncountable. There is a 
cut-off between countable and uncountable sets such that a set in the power set of  X cannot be 
corresponded to an element in  X [65]. To overcome this cut-off, the “ZF axiomatic system” of set 
theory introduces a particular axiom called the “Axiom of Choice” which states that for any set there 
exists a “choice function”. The axiom of choice is rewritten in modern category theory stating that  
any epimorphism has a section [66]. In other words, this implies that in set theory any onto map 
f:A→B has a particular map, section r:B→A such that fr: B→B coincide with an identity map of B. 
This is a condition under which a representative of a set can be chosen. Now, let us proceed by  
considering a set  A to be the 'outside' consisting of objects, and let  B be the 'inside' consisting of 
representations,  and  a  map  f:A→B to  be  a  cognitive  process  relating  outside  objects  to  inside 
representations. We call  x  and  f(x),  an object and its representation, respectively. An equivalence 
relation R on A is derived by a map f, defined by xRy for x, y∈A such that f(x)=f(y). It results in the 
'outside' set of objects partitioned into a set of equivalence class such that
                                              [x]R = {y∈A | xRy}.                                                                                (1)
Due to the axiom of choice one can choose one representative s for an equivalence class [x]R . For 
example, imagine that the 'outside' consists of a three cats one tabby, one white, and one black two  
dogs, one a white dog and the other a black dog; and that the three cats as objects are mapped to their 
representative class  CAT, and the two dogs are  mapped to their  representative class  DOG. This 
results in two equivalence classes, {tabby cat, black cat, white cat} and {white dog, black dog}. Due  
to the axiom of choice one can choose a tabby cat as a representative for the class CAT and a white  
dog as a  representative for  the class  DOG. Obviously it  results  to  a  one-to-one correspondence 
between the 'inside' and 'outside' if one neglects objects but not their representatives. In other words  
the axiom of choice implements a kind of 'illusionary' one-to-one correspondence between the inside 
and outside (Fig. 1). Therefore, such an isomorphism between the inside and outside can be achieved 
by the axiom of choice. The outside is, however, not trivial a priori. As objects are gradually and  
empirically identified as objects a posteriori,  it suggests that is difficult for us to map objects to 
representations easily. The question we address now, as it readily arises, is how this situation can be 
implemented in a formal fraamework.
3-2 Ambiguity of representation implemented by two maps
We  here  implement  “cognition  against  the  cut-off  between  the  inside  and  outside”  by 
weakening the axiom of choice such that the choice of a representative is destined to be ambiguous.  
Or, as the above implies, that a representative cannot be uniquely chosen. Such an ambiguous choice 
is defined here by two maps f and g:A→f(A). Let the equivalence relations derived from f and g be R 
and  K,  respectively.  Since  a  cognitive  process  g conflicts  f for  some  x∈A (i.e.  f(x)≠g(x)),  the 
definition of  g has to be considered under a particular condition of an inhibition equipped with a 
symmetry and a locality law, as is discussed further below.
Before determining a representation of x in a term of g, we introduce the inhibitory directed 
network H defined by a quadruple <E, V, ds, dt> where E, V are the respectively the sets of edges and 
vertexes. And where ds:E→V and dt:E→V are the maps assigning a source and a target of an edge, 
respectively. We here define V=f(A), and ds(E)=dt(E)=f(A). Let the elements of f(A) to be b1, b2, …, bn 
(representation with respect to f). A representation (an element of f(A)) derives an equivalence class 
(a subset of A) which has no intersection with each other, therefore it is  a partition. We here denote a 
partition derived by bk with respect to f as
                                         bkf = {x∈A | f(x)=bk}.                                                                                (2)
Similarly an equivalence class with respect to g:A→f(A) is denoted by bkg.
The directed inhibitory network  H is sequentially determined under a symmetry law and 
locality law by the following: (i) Initialize M, a natural number by the cardinality of f(A)≥4, and D a 
subset of  f(A) by f(A):  M = |D|. (ii) If  M>0, choose a natural number m with M-2≥m>1 randomly, 
where if  M is  smaller  than 4 then  m=M,  and otherwise (0≥M),  the process is  terminated.  Then 
replace M by M-m.  (iii) Choose m representations y1,  y2, …,  ym in D randomly and one element x in 
{ y1, y2, …, ym } also randomly, and link x with any yk by an edge ek, such that ds(ek)=x and dt(ek)=yk so as 
to satisfy a symmetry and locality law, however bk never link with bk; Symmetry law requires that if 
there is an edge,  e  such that  ds(e)=bp and  dt(e)=bq then there is an edge,  r such that  ds(r)=bq and 
dt(r)=bp; Locality law implies that if there are two edges e such that ds(e)=bp and dt(e)=bq and l such 
that ds(l)=bp and dt(l)=bu then there is an edge, r such that ds(e)=bq and dt(e)=bu. (iv) Elements chosen 
by the procedure (iii), { y1,  y2,  …,  ym }, are eliminated from  D. (v) The procedure of (ii) to (iv) is 
repeated till the procedure is terminated.
The symmetry law in the inhibitory network, for our example, implies that if an individual 
cat is not like a dog, an individual dog is not like a cat. Locality law implies that dissimilarity does 
not expand unnecessarily. Fig. 2 top left shows a part of an inhibitory network where m=3. Since the 
cardinality of f(A) is 5, inhibitory network is not completed. Given a link from b2 to b3 and to b5 in 
Fig. 2 top left (m=3), the symmetry law induces another links from b3 to b2 and from b5 to b2 (Fig. 2 
top right) and the locality law induces a link from  b3 to  b5  (Fig. 2 middle left). Finally a part of 
inhibitory network is completed by a network among  b2,  b3 and  b5 only due to the symmetry and 
locality law (Fig. 2 middle right). When a source b1 links with a target b4 and a source b4 links with a 
target  b1  as shown in Fig. 2 bottom left, an inhibitory network is completed. Inhibitory network is  
represented by a matrix as shown in Fig. 2 bottom right. Take an element of a matrix at a column bj 
and a row bi. If there is a link between bi and bj, in the inhibitory network, then a component at (bi, 
bj) is blank (0), and otherwise it is painted in black (1) in a matrix. The obtained matrix consists of a 
diagonal  matrix  whose  diagonal  elements  are  1  and  others  are  0’s,  with  a  background  whose  
components are all 1’s.
Directed inhibitory network  H  straightforwardly determines a secondary map  g:A→f(A). 
Imagine that  there are satisfactory many elements in each equivalence classes with respect to  f. 
Referring to the network H as shown in Fig. 2, an element in an equivalence class is mapped to an  
element of f(A) as shown in Fig. 3. Elements in an equivalence class, b1f are mapped to any elements 
of f(A) except for b4 because a matrix in Fig. 2 bottom right shows that b4 in g(A) (column) is linked 
with b1 in f(A) (row) in the inhibitory network H. Similarly elements in b2f is mapped to any elements 
of f(A) except for b3 and b5 due to the inhibitory network and then they are mapped to b1, b4 and b2.
If  the  secondary  map  g is  defined  so  as  to  satisfy  the  directed  inhibitory  network,  the 
relation between equivalence classes (i.e. partitions) with respect to  f and g can be rearranged to a 
particular matrix which consists of various size of diagonal matrices. Fig. 4 top left shows a given  
matrix produced by a relation between equivalence classes with respect to  f and  g, where if there 
exists an element  x in  A f(x)=i and  g(x)=j then a component at (i,  j) is 1 and otherwise 0. The 
algorithm to construct a matrix consisting of diagonal matrices is started from collecting a column 
which has 0 component at the same row. The 4th components in the 1- and 3-column in a given 
matrix are 0, and the 1st components in the 1- and 6-colums are 0. Then all columns, 1-, 3- and 6-
columns are pasted with each other, and are constructed to a block. Similarly a block consisting of 
2-, 4- and 5-columns is formed and a similar block is obtained. As the obtained two blocks are  
formed, a matrix rearranged in a term of columns is further obtained (Fig. 4 bottom). 
Fig. 5 shows a similar procedure in a term of rows. Finally we obtain a matrix consisting of 
diagonal matrices equipped with 1-components background as shown in Fig. 5 bottom left. Because 
columns having 0 component at the same row, and rows having 0 component at the same column can 
be arranged in the form of a diagonal matrix, it can be straightforwardly verified that this algorithm 
can lead to a matrix consisting of diagonal matrices. 
Fig. 6 shows a matrix consisting of diagonal matrices computed by this procedure which are 
constructed for a given relation between equivalence classes with respect to  f and  g satisfying the 
inhibitory relation, where component of 1 and 0 are reversely represented, compared to the matrix 
shown in Fig. 4 and 5. If there is no element x in A such that f(x)=i and g(x)=j, then a component at 
(i, j) is 0 (blank), otherwise it is 1 (black). An matrix obtained following this shows a 'universe' 
consisting of 'sub-universes' for which any concept in that 'sub-universe' can be constructed by a 
possible union of equivalence classes. However, the sub-universes are partially overlapping each 
other, and therefore some concepts which would be possibly constructed by union of equivalence 
classes employed to different sub-universes cannot be obtained. We turn now to the question of  
characterization of the whole 'universe' in terms of its logic structure. Using rough set analysis [41] 
we  subsequently  show  that  the  structure  of  the  whole  'universe'  can  be  verified  to  be  an 
orthomodular lattice in terms of lattice theory [42-43, 67-68].
3-3 A lattice derived from a rough set approximation
As mentioned in section 3-1, a map  f:A→B induces an equivalence relation  R such that 
xRy ⇔ f(x)=f(y). By using such an equivalence class of R, any subset X in A can be approximated as 
a rough set in upper or lower approximation. The upper approximation of X with respect to R, R*(X) 
is defined by
                                            R*(X) = {y∈[x]R | [x]R∩X≠∅}.                                                                 (3)
If  an  equivalence  class  is  compared  to  a  neighborhood  in  topology,  upper  approximation  is 
analogous to closure. Lower approximation of X with respect to R, R*(X) is defined by
                                           R*(X) = {y∈[x]R | [x]R⊆X }.                                                                       (4)
The lower approximation is analogous to the set of the interior points in topology. It is clear to see  
that for any x∈A
R*([x]R)=[x]R,    R*([x]R)=[x]R.                                                                    (5)
Thus any union of equivalence classes is also a fixed point with respect to R* and R*. We define a 
lattice <LR, ⊆> such that LR is a collection of fixed points satisfying
R*(X)=X                                                                                        (6)
for X⊆A and they are ordered by inclusion. A lattice is a partially ordered set closed with respect to 
meet and join operations of two elements, where the join of two elements is the least element which 
is larger than both of two elements and the meet of two elements is the greatest element which is  
smaller than both of two elements [67, 68]. The meet in LR is defined by intersection, and the join is 
defined by union, which implies LR is a set lattice and is a Boolean algebra. In other words, any of 
the  concepts  in  a  set  lattice  can  be  constructed  by  possible  combinations  of  atoms  which  are  
partitions. If a fixed point (6) is replaced by R*(X)=X, then the same Boolean algebra is obtained.
How is  a  set  lattice  <LR,  ⊆> represented  in  the  form of  a  matrix  between partitions? 
Because a partition has no intersection with each other, only a diagonal component is 1 (i.e.  f(bi)= 
f(bi)) in a matrix whose rows and columns are partitions of R. In other words, <LR, ⊆> is represented 
by a matrix whose diagonal components are 1’s and any other components are 0’s of the relation  
between partitions, which is nothing but a diagonal matrix. In other words, a set lattice or a Boolean 
algebra is represented by a diagonal matrix.
3-4 Orthomodular lattice derived from ambiguous representation
 We now proceed in characterizing the lattice that represents the relation between partitions 
of f and g satisfying the inhibitory network (i.e. a matrix consisting of diagonal matrices). This can 
be readily illustrated in terms of a concrete implementation, for example by using a diagonal matrix  
shown in Fig. 5bottom left, we can estimate the properties of its lattice. Number the column and 
rows in a given matrix, from the top to the bottom, or from the left to the right,  b1,  b2,  …,  b6, 
respectively. Assume that rows represent partitions derived by  g, and columns represent partitions 
derived by f. In this sense a component which is 1 at (i, j) shows that there exists an element x in A 
such that f(x) = g(x), or that big∩bjf≠∅. Call the above left diagonal matrix, B1, and the below right 
one, B2. Since a matrix implies ambiguity of representation, f and g, the approximation in a term of a 
rough set has to compose two kinds of equivalence relation,  R derived by  f, and  K derived by  g. 
Fixed points with respect to the composition of two kinds of rough set approximation are collected in 
order to obtain a lattice. Let us now demonstrate how this composition is obtained and its lattice  
properties:
Assume that the composition of approximation is defined by the order from K to R. Under 
this assumption, we can consider four kinds of compositions,  R*K*,  R*K*,  R*K* and  R*K*. We here 
estimate these compositions with respect to whether a partition is allowed as a fixed point. Consider 
the case of R*K*. We readily obtain that R*K*(b1f) = R*({y∈[x]K | [x]K∩b1f≠∅}) = R*(b1g∪b4g∪b5g∪b6g) 
=  b1f∪b2f∪b3f∪b4f∪b5f∪b6f =  A. This implies that a partition  b1f is not a fixed point with respect to 
R*K*. Next we consider the case,  R*K*. Actually, R*K*(b1 f) = R*({y∈[x]K | [x]K⊆b1g}) = R*(∅) = ∅. 
Therefore it follows that b1f is not a fixed point with respect to R*K*. Next we consider the case of the 
R*K* composition, we see that  R*K*(b1 f) =  R*({y∈[x]K | [x]K∩b1 f≠∅}) =  R*(b1g∪b4g∪b5g∪b6g) =b1f. 
This verification can be generalized to any number of partitions. Thus we can say that any partition 
with respect to f can be a fixed point X for the equation,
                           R*K*(X) =X.                                       　                                                (7a)
Finally for the composition  R*K*(X) we observe that, as we previously showed, a collection of a 
solution for equation (5) is a lattice whose partial order is defined by inclusion, and that lattices 
defined by a collection of fixed points for R*K*(X) =X, R*K*(X) =X, K*R*(X) =X and K*R*(X) =X are 
isomorphic  to  one another.  Consequently  we can estimate  the  logic  of  a  universe consisting  of  
ambiguous representation, by a fixed point with respect to an operation, R*K* or R*K*. It implies that 
a fixed point
R*K*(X) = X                                                                                            (7b)
is also adopted to construct a lattice.
Next we estimate the detail of logical structure of a collection of fixed points mentioned 
above. In referring to Fig. 5 bottom left, we obtain R*K*(b1f∪b2f) = R*({y∈[x]K | [x]K∩(b1f∪b2f) ≠∅}) 
= R*(b1g∪b2g∪b4g∪b5g∪b6g) = b1f∪b2f. Similarly, R*K*(b1f∪b3f) = b1f∪b3f, and R*K*(b2f∪b3f) = b2f∪b3f. 
However, R*K*(b1f∪b2f∪b3f) = R*(A) =A. It is clear to see that the least element of a lattice, an empty 
set is a fixed point with respect to any operators of rough set approximation, and that R*K*(∅) = ∅. 
Thus  the  block  B1 reveals  all  possible  union  of  partitions  except  for  a  union  of  all  partitions 
constituting B1. The block B2 also satisfies the same condition. Therefore, we obtain all elements of a 
lattice obtained from a matrix as shown in Fig. 5 bottom left, by {∅}∪{b1f, b2f, b3f, b1f∪b2f, b2f∪b3f  , 
b1f∪b3f }∪{b4f, b5f, b6f, b4f∪b5f, b5f∪b6f, b4f∪b6f}∪{A}.
This construction can be generalized for any matrix consisting of diagonal matrices with a 
background of 1 components. Assume that a matrix consists of a block, B1, B2, …, Bn, where each 
block, Bk consists of 1-component (bk1, bk1), (bk2, bk2), …, (bks, bks). Simply, we state that Bk consists of 
bk1, bk2, …, bks. Each block yields elements of a lattice such as
                 I(u,w)
                  ∪ bkp(w, i)f = bkp(w, 1)f∪bkp(w, 2)f∪…∪bkp(w, I(u, w))f                                                                 (8)
                 i = 1
where p(w,  i)∈{1, 2, …, s} with p(w,  i)≠ p(w,  j) for i≠j, and I(u, w) = 2u-1 for u=1, 2, …, s-1, and 
w=1, …, sCu for each u, and where ∪I(u,w)bkp(w, i)f ≠ ∪I(u,v)bkp(v, i)f for w≠v. Consider the case with s=3, of 
which Bk consists of bk1, bk2 and bk3. If u=1, then w=1, 2, 3, I(1, 1)=I(1, 2)=I(1, 3)=20=1, and elements 
of a lattice, ∪I(1, 1)bkp(1,  i)f=bkp(1, 1)f=bk1f, ∪I(1, 2)bkp(2,  i)f=bkp(2, 1)f=bk2f, ∪I(1, 3)bkp(3,  i)f=bkp(3, 1)f=bk3f. Since bkp(1, 1)f  
≠ bkp(2, 1)f, bkp(2, 1)f≠ bkp(3, 1)f, three different elements can be obtained. Similarly, if u=2, then I(2, 1)=…
=I(2,  3C2)=I(2,  3)=21=2 and elements of  a lattice,  ∪I(2,1)bkp(1,  i)f=bk1f∪bk2f,  ∪I(2,2)bkp(2,  i)f=bk1f∪bk3f,  …, 
∪I(2,3)bkp(3, i)f=bk1f∪bk3f. Since u≠s, then a union of all partitions of bk1, bk2, … and bks is not an element 
of a lattice. Instead, the least and the greatest element of a lattice, which are
          　　　　A,  　Ø ,                                                    　　　　　　　　　　　 (9)
respectively, are also elements of a lattice. It is easily verified that  R*K*(A) =  A. We call a lattice 
whose elements are defined by (8) and (9), a block lattice L(Bk), where a block lattice is derived by a 
block matrix Bk. It is clear to see that each ∪I(1,  w)bkp(w,  i)f=bkjf is an atom of a block lattice, where an 
element x of a lattice is an atom if and only if there is no any other element between x and the least 
element of a lattice. 
Further we show that the union of atoms which belong to different block lattices is not a 
fixed point with respect to R*K* : Let different block lattices in a given lattice derived from diagonal 
matrices,  L(Bk)  and  L(Bh),  and  take  an  atom  bkif from  L(Bk)  and  an  atom  bhjf from  L(Bh).  It  is 
straightforward to see that  R*K*(bkif∪bhjf)=R*(A)=A,  and that  bkif∪bhjf is not a fixed point of  R*K*. 
Because background of diagonal matrices consists of 1-components,  A-b(k)g is related to  bkif and A-
b(h)g is related to bhjf, where b(k)g = ∪bkpg and p can be 1, 2, … except for i, and b(h)g = ∪bhqg and q can 
be 1, 2, … except for j. Thus,
 K*(bkif∪bhjf)=(A-b(k)g)∪(A-b(h)g)=(b(k)g)c∪(b(h)g)c =(b(k)g∩b(h)g)c=∅c=A,          　 　　　(10)
where  Bc represents a complement of  B such that  B∩Bc=∅ and  B∪Bc=A.  It shows that union of 
atoms from different block lattices is not a fixed point respect to R*K*and it is not an element of a 
lattice  for  a  given matrix.  It  also means that  there  is  no element overlapping in  different  block 
lattices, except for the least and the greatest element.
Each block lattice is a Boolean algebra. Each block lattice consists of elements of a set  
lattice except for a union of all partitions, and the greatest element of a whole lattice, A which can be 
also the greatest element of each block. That is why each block lattice, L(Bk) from which a union of 
all partitions is removed and to which  A is added, is isomorphic to a set lattice that is a Boolean 
algebra. Consequently, we can say that a lattice derived from a matrix which consists of n diagonal 
matrices with a background of 1-components, LD is expressed as
       　　　　    n
LD = ∪ L(Bk).                                                                                           (11)
                         k=1
Each L(Bk) is a Boolean algebra. For any i, j∈{1, 2, …, n} with i≠j,
                                          L(Bi)∩L(Bj)={A, ∅}.                                                                               (12)
The above shows that  LD is an almost disjoint union of Boolean algebras. To estimate whether a 
lattice  LD is an orthomodular lattice or not, we have to refer to the presence of  n-rank loop in a 
lattice, which is defined by the following: A finite series of Boolean algebras, L(B1), L(B2), …, L(Bn) 
is a loop with rank n if this series satisfies
                                          L(Bi)∩L(Bi+1) = {A, ∅, Z, Zc}                                           (13a)
                                           j∉{i-1, i, i+1},  L(Bi)∩L(Bj) = {A, ∅}                                   (13b)
                                          i, j, k∈{1, 2, …, n},  i≠j≠k, i≠k,  L(Bi)∩L(Bj)∩L(Bk) = {A, ∅}.           (13c)
In equation (13a)  Z  represents an atom common in both  Bi and  Bi+1.  An orthomodular lattice  is 
defined by an almost disjoint union of Boolean algebras without a loop with rank 3 or 4. The  LD 
never contains a pair of block satisfying equation (13a) because of (12), LD never contains a loop of 
rank 3 or 4. Especially if LD contains no loop, it is an orthocomplemented lattice. It shows that LD is 
an orthomodular lattice, and it is also an orthocomplemented lattice.
Fig. 7 shows a lattice derived from a matrix shown in Fig. 5 bottom left. Since a matrix 
consists of two diagonal blocks, a lattice is a quasi-disjoint union of two Boolean algebras. Each  
diagonal matrix contains three diagonal elements, and that shows 23-Boolean algebra. Each element 
of a lattice is represented by a circle in Hasse diagram as shown in Fig. 7. If X⊆Y, an element X is 
located below an element Y, and if there is no element between X and Y, two elements are linked by 
a line. Each lattice consisting of eight elements represents 23-Boolean algebra. Since the greatest (A) 
and the least  element (∅)  are common to two 23-Boolean algebras, a lattice  corresponding to  a 
matrix in Fig. 5 is represented by a Hasse diagram in Fig. 7 right. It implies that a lattice represents  
an orthocomplemented lattice. Thus, it is also an orthomodular lattice. Similarly, Fig. 8 shows a 
Hasse diagram of a lattice corresponding to a matrix shown in Fig. 6 above. Since a matrix consists 
of  a  diagonal matrix  containing six elements,  two diagonal  matrices with  five  elements  or  two  
elements, a lattice consists of one 26-Boolean algebras, two 25-Boolean algebras and two 22-Boolean 
algebras. Broken lines are used to indicate that the greatest and least elements represented by circles  
are common to all block lattices (they are not used to indicate inclusion relation or order). The above 
testifies also that the lattice at hand is an orthomodular (and orthocomplemented) lattice.
According  to  Birkhoff  and  Neumann  [69],  the  closed  subspace  of  a  Hilbert  space 
formulation of quantum mechanics forms an orthomodular lattice. Although Mackey attempted to 
provide an axiomatic system of quantum logic as an orthocomplemented lattice, it is has not been 
satisfactorily demonstrated [13]. An orthomodular lattice is of crucial importance to quantum logic 
[42, 43]. Our argument shows that human cognition appearing in as a macroscopic phenomenon also 
reveals an inherent quantum logic and therefore quantum-like effects. How is our model related to 
quantum conjectures in cognitive systems is the subject of the next section.
4. Quantum Bayes inference
In this section we show that our work is consistent with quantum theoretical conjecture 
proposed  by  Arecchi  and  discussed  in  Section  1.  As  mentioned  before,  decision  to  an  external 
stimulus could result from a choice of a neural group which can give rise to largest synchronized and 
distributed  domains  of  correlates.  Such  a  process  called  apprehension  can  be  implemented  by 
(forward) Bayes inference as proposed by Arecchi:
P(h*) = P(h|d) = P(h)P(d|h)/P(d),                                                                       (14)
where P(h) is an a priori probability of hypothesis  h,  d is data, P(d|h) is a priori probability that  d 
results from h, P(d) is a probability we observe data d, and P(h*) is a posteriori probability among a 
priori hypothesis. Since Bayesian inference is compared to a process of climbing a mountain within  
a  landscape  of  coded  data  searching  by  using  only  local  information,  P(h*)  provides  the  next 
plausible climbing step obtained from the previous step, P(h), provided  by the data from an external 
stimulus, P(d), and especially of the external stimulus received at the position of the previous step, 
P(d|h). If an isolated unique stimulus is given, the process of data apprehension occurs.
When two successive stimuli are given within a specified short term, the first apprehension 
stored  is  retrieved  and is  compared  to  the  second one.  Thus  it  can give  rise  to  the  process  of  
judgment. If this process is also to be compared to the climbing of a mountain within a landscape of 
coded data, the mountain would contain multiple peaks which prohibits a climber only with local  
view to climb to the globally highest peak. Globally optimum solution is obtained not by logical 
computation but by a non-logical jump. According to Arecchi, the non-logical jumps appearing in 
cognition provide evidence for quantum-like effects, and this is implemented by an inverse Bayes 
inference. From equation (14), the inverse Bayes inference is expressed by
P(d|h) = P(d) P(h*) /P(h).                                                                         (15)
Where now the data  (d)  and a  posteriori  hypothesis  (h*) represent  the current  stimulus and the 
previous  one,  respectively.  The  most  suitable  algorithm,  P(d|h)  that  best  matches  d and  h*  is 
obtained by an inverse Bayes inference. Since the inverse Bayes inference contains non-algorithmic 
jump, P(d|h) is not a simple modification of the formula from equation (14) but an equation obtained 
from modification of the hypothesis, P(h). Therefore, P(d|h) cannot be obtained by simple iterations 
of recursive process, hence its non-algorithmic nature.
Quantum Bayes inference proposed by Arecchi can be compared to our cognitive model 
based  on ambiguous  representation.  First  we replace  terms in  Bayes  inference  by our  data  and 
approximations. Because a given set of data d in Bayes inference can be replaced with a given subset 
X in a universal set A, and because lower and upper approximations for X have the following order,
                                           R*(X) ⊆ X ⊆ R*(X),                                                                                 (16)
data coupled with a priori hypothesis such as  P(d|h) can be replaced by the upper approximation, 
R*(X), and data coupled with a posteriori hypothesis such as P(h|d) = P(h*) can be replaced by the 
lower approximation, R*(X). From inequality (16), any element in the lower approximation is X, and 
only  some elements  in  the  upper  approximation  are  elements  of  X.  Thus,  the  lower  and  upper 
approximation could correspond to satisfactory and necessary condition, respectively. That is why 
the upper and lower approximation could be considered to correspond to the a priori and a posteriori  
hypotheses, respectively.
How is the Bayesian inference implemented in our ambiguous representation? In equation 
(14), h is replaced by equivalence relation, R derived by a particular representation (map), P(d|h) is 
replaced by  R*(X), and  P(h|d) =  P(h*) is replaced by  R*(X). Therefore, Bayesian inference is the 
process of computing  R*(X) from  R*(X) (i.e. from a priori to a posteriori).  So as to achieve this 
computation  data,  X,  is  implemented  by  a  particular  form  because  R* is  used  instead  of  an 
equivalence class, [x]R. Finally the Bayesian inference is expressed, for any subset X in a universal 
set A, by
                                          R*(X) = {y∈R*({x}) | R*({x})⊆X}.                                                          (17)
It is clear to see that equation (17) can be verified because  R*({x})=[x]R. In this sense the inverse 
Bayes inference is the process of computing R*(X) from R*(X) (i.e. from a posteriori to a priori). This 
process however, does not hold as
                                           R*(X) ≠ {y∈R*({x}) | R*({x})∩X ≠ ∅}.                                                 (18)
If [x]R⊃{x}, R*({x})=∅, and then even if R*(X) is not empty, the right hand term in equation (18) is 
empty if for all x in X [x]R⊃{x}.
The question that arises now is how the inequality in equation (18) can be replaced by 
equality. We can answer this question by finding a particular condition under which equality in (18) 
holds. Since  X is any subset of a universal set, there exists a case of which  X={x}. We generalize 
such a case and replace {x} and X by a particular set X that is a subset of the universal set, and obtain
                                          R*(X) ∼ {y∈R*(X) | R*(X)∩X≠ ∅}.                                                           
(19)
The symbol ∼ just signifies a relation which contains a particular equivalence relation as a subset.  
Because equivalence relation R never equate the left with right term in (19), an equivalence relation 
has to be replaced by another one, K which can be expected to equate the left with the right term for 
more subsets X in the universal set A. Compared to the inverse Bayesian inference, to compute an a 
priori  hypothesis  R*(Y),  a  non-algorithmic  jump  related  to  quantum-like  effects  corresponds  to 
replacing a relation  R by another relation  K.  We also implement the way to collect an element, 
y∈R*(X) by  y∈Y, where  Y  is an equivalence class with respect to  R, and restrict  Y to a subset  X. 
Then,
                                           R*(Y) ∼ {y∈Y | K*(Y)∩Y≠ ∅}.                                                               (20)
Since Y is an equivalence class with respect to R, Y per se can play a role in collecting an element. 
The right hand term in relation (20) implies the upper approximation of  K*(Y) with respect to  R 
insofar as Y is an equivalence class with respect to R. Since K*(Y)⊆Y, if K*(Y)=∅, {y∈Y | K*(Y)∩Y≠ 
∅} = ∅, and otherwise {y∈Y | K*(Y)∩Y≠ ∅} = Y. Then we obtain
                                           R*(Y) = {y∈Y | K*(Y)∩Y≠ ∅} = R*(K*(Y)),                                            (21)
if K*(Y) ≠ ∅. This implies that there is a particular relation between equivalence classes with respect 
to K and R including a condition such that K*(Y) = [x]K and R*([x]K) = Y. That is a condition which is 
satisfied by a pair of equivalence relations derived by a pair of maps, f and g under a constraint of an 
inhibitory network equipped with symmetry and locality. Such a pair of equivalence relations can 
constitute a matrix consisting of diagonal matrices with 1-components background. It is also crucial 
in comparing our model to that of Arecchi’s that a collection of fixed points is naturally introduced 
in the form of (21), R*(K*(Y))=Y.
Finally we conclude that the inverse Bayesian inference can be implemented by equation 
(21) which contains a non-logical jump such as the modification of the original hypothesis (i.e. a  
novel equivalence relation) from R to K. Especially, since there is a particular relation between R and 
K of which a relation between them constitutes a matrix consisting of diagonal matrices with 1-
components background, a lattice resulting from a collection of fixed points satisfying R*(K*(Y))=Y 
is an orthomodular lattice.  In other  words, the non-logical jump is  contained within the inverse 
Bayesian  inference  and  could  refer  to  quantum-like  effects.  Therefore  our  cognitive  model  is  
consistent with the inverse Bayesian inference suggested by Arecchi.
5. Conclusion
        This work aims in contributing to the discussion of apprehension and judgment as processes  
studied  within  the  scope  of  self-awareness  or  self-consciousness  as  studied  in  terms  of  neural  
correlations. As certain aspects of brain-machine analogy are progressing, our work can give rise to 
the  implementation  of  algorithmic  procedures  aiding  to  decision  making,  such  as  the  Bayesian 
inference, in its classical and quantum versions. It also strengthens analogies in thought with respect 
to functions and faculties of consciousness as integrated information representation and processing. 
As brain sciences search for particular network structures by which information is integrated and 
embedded our approach can be regarded as aiming towards understanding the basic features of the  
globally  superimposed  constraints  networks  through  macroscopic  correlations  giving  rise  to 
judgment and even conscious discrimination.
        Regardless of the progress of brain-machine analogy, decision making related to a successive  
apprehension containing judgment could appeal towards the limits of this analogy in a way to a 
brain-machine dis-analogy. Because the judgment cannot be implemented by a computation in which 
the same algorithm is successively applied to data, and has to be equipped with non-algorithmic 
jump affected by the quantum-like effects and an underlying quantum-like logic. It can also appeal 
that  judgment,  conceptualization  and/or  category  creation  in  human  cognition  has  to  be  non-
algorithmic processes, and that they cannot be implemented by a machine in a strict algorithmic 
fashion.
Crowds of cortical neurons provide the appropriate same substratum, in terms of complexity 
flexibility, adaptability and plasticity, for collective agreement and synchronization in both instances 
of  apprehension  and  judgment.  A fascinating  question  is  whether  or  not  this  is  the  only  such 
substratum in  existence.  Research  in  collective  decision  making  and  event  anticipation  in  other 
crowds -that of social animals such as bees, ants, even  physarum polycephalum and other model 
systems [70]- reveal certain analogies in recruiting and consensus building. Our approach might help 
in shedding new light and in instigating research towards this kind of investigations.
         The inverse Bayesian inference containing non-algorithmic jumps or referring to quantum-like 
aspects  is  here  supported and related to  the process of  approximation with respect  to  rough set 
analysis.  Rough  set  analysis  here  captures  the  minimal  requirements  of  a  coarse  grained 
representation  of  the  environment  through  the  sensory  and  conceptual  filters  of  the  observer. 
Ebelling and Feisel (see chap 9 of [1] and also [60]) ascribe to information processing the key role to 
survival of any living observer. In the abstract framework chosen we are able to capture the minimal  
aspects  of  these  fundamentally  self-referential  feedback  loops  and  its  primary  semantics  while  
probing the environment, “out there”, at the instances of apprehension and judgment,  “from the  
inside”.
The formation of hypotheses per se can correspond to the equivalence relation derived from the 
mapping from objects to their representations. The a priori and a posteriori hypotheses in Bayesian 
inference were shown to correspond to the upper and lower approximations for an object in rough set 
analysis. While Bayesian inference was expressed as a formulation of the lower approximation based 
on the upper approximation (i.e. degeneracy of hypothesis a posteriori from a priori), the inverse 
Bayesian inference has to be implemented by a formulation of the upper approximation based on the  
lower approximation with modification or replacement of the algorithms in question. It is, therefore, 
implemented  by  composition  of  different  approximations  with  respect  to  different  equivalence 
relations. That is nothing but a non-algorithmic jump revealing the associated quantum-like effects  
reported in the literature. The approximation proposed, based on the composition of two kinds of 
equivalence relations, leads to a logic expressed as an orthomodular lattice. Conversely it reveals  
that  the modification or  replacement of  algorithms (i.e.  replacement of  equivalence relations)  is 
affected by the reported quantum-like effects.
          Even if it is assumed that neurons constituting a brain are expressed as chaotic neurons, brain-
machine dis-analogy referring to the non-algorithmic jump can be found. The non-algorithmic jump 
can be further investigated as the non-algorithmic interaction between syntax and semantics through 
a particular mixture or ambiguity open to both syntax and semantics or equivalently to both local and 
global properties. We demonstrated here, thanks to a formulation of the inverse Bayesian inference,  
that computing processes expressed as rough set approximations with non-algorithmic jumps are  
expressions of the orthomodularity of the underlying lattice which refers to a quantum logic or to 
quantum-like effects  in  cognition.  Furthermore,  our work suggests  that  complex and ambiguous 
macroscopic phenomena such as cognition and decision making can be related to quantum theory at 
large.
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Figure captions
Figure  1.  Schematic  diagram  showing  the  one-to-one  corresponding  between  objects  and 
representations  due  to  the  axiom  of  choice.  A map,  f from  the  outside  (objects)  to  the  inside 
(representations) entails partitions in the outside (left above). Thanks to the axiom of choice, one 
representative  can  be  chosen  for  each  partition  (left  below).  In  ignoring  all  elements  but 
representatives, one can find the one-to-one correspondence between the 'inside' and 'outside' (right).
Figure 2. Construction for directed inhibitory network of <E, V,  ds, dt> where V={b1, b2,  b3,  b4, b5}. 
Initially one vertex is chosen randomly and edges whose source is a chosen vertex are also randomly 
chosen (top left). By using symmetry (top right) and locality law (middle left)  a local network is 
obtained (middle right). Successive applying the procedure for all elements of V leads to a directed 
inhibitory network (left bottom) which can be expressed as a particular matrix (right bottom).
Figure 3. Construction for a pair of maps, f and g from a set of objects, A to a set of representations 
f(A). Given a map  f:A→B,  the other map  g is determined so as to satisfy the directed inhibitory 
network.
Figure  4.  Construction  for  a  matrix  consisting  of  diagonal  matrices  with  background  of  1-
components, with respect to rearrangement of columns.
Figure  5.  Construction  for  a  matrix  consisting  of  diagonal  matrices  with  background  of  1-
components, with respect to rearrangement of rows. It is continued from Figure 4. If a pair of maps 
satisfy the relationship constrained by a directed inhibitory network, rearrangement of columns and 
rows in a particular procedure (see text) can yield a matrix consisting of diagonal matrices with 
background of 1-components.
Figure  6.  Construction  for  a  matrix  consisting  of  diagonal  matrices  with  background  of  1-
components implemented in a machine, from left to right. Each block in right matrix represents a 
Boolean algebra whose atoms are  represented by diagonal elements.  A lattice  is  obtained as an 
almost disjoint union of Boolean algebras.
Figure 7. Hasse diagram of a lattice obtained from a matrix shown in Figure 5 below. Left two 
diagrams connected by the symbol “+” show two Boolean algebras obtained from two blocks in a  
given matrix. A whole matrix corresponding to a given matrix is an almost disjoint union of two 
Boolean algebras, where the least and the greatest elements are common to both Boolean algebras.
Figure 8. Hasse diagram of a lattice obtained from a matrix shown in Figure 6 above. A matrix 
consists of five blocks. A whole matrix corresponding to a given matrix is an almost disjoint union of 
five Boolean algebras. Each Hasse diagram of Boolean algebra corresponds to each block in a given  
matrix. The least and the greatest elements common to both Boolean algebras are represented by 
circles.
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